619 study of the whole Western Desert, or in an analysis of
*613 contemporary politics in Marsa Matruh.

The Bedouins of al-Qasr are, in this study, the 'Aishaibat of the 'Ali Ahmar of the Awlad 'Ali tribe. The
[191] Bedouin tribal unit throughout the Middle East is described as a segmentary lineage system. Something of the meaning of this concept has already been made clear in our discussion of the structural principles of Bedouin society. This type
[114] of society has been adequately analyzed by Evans-Pritchard (1940), Fortes (1945 and 1949), Smith (1956), Middleton and Tait (1958), and Peters (1960). My own ideas about the segmentary lineage society as it functions in al-Qasr derive from these sources.

*613 Politically, the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr are a stateless
571 society; they have no centralized political institution. The
•[642] lineage system is the structural framework for social and political relations. The basis of government, i.e., the regulation of authority relations, is the balanced protraction of corporate groups which support institutional uniformities in the form of similar organization, ideology and procedure (Smith 1956). Although the various groupings of the segmentary system can be analytically identified, and each grouping thinks of itself as a distinct group, in actuality, it is difficult to define the groups because of the way in which each fuses into lesser or greater differentiated units in one

577 According to this 'aqila, the "good man" is the "good Muslim"
771 who observes the pillars of Islam (fasting, praying, making
183 the pilgrimage, and alms-giving). Also, the "good man" does not steal or lie, and this leads, importantly enough, to social accord.

121 In light of the preceding discussion of authority and
681 law, we can now offer a description of the Bedouin judicial process in action. Southall (1956:121-151) has drawn the
121 distinction between internal and external delicts on the
681 bases of kinds of sanctions rendered, and whether or not
114 chiefly authority mediates conflict. Such a distinction can be only partially applied in the case of the Bedouins of the Western Desert. The kind of sanctions operating in the internal political system do differ from those applied in the external political system, though not to the same degree which is true
121 of Southall's Alurland. On the other hand, since Bedouin
681 society, lacking political centralization, cannot be character-
692 ized as a segmentary state with distinct spheres of authority
• 642 at successive levels of the lineage structure, the intervention or non-intervention of chiefly adjudication and decision-making cannot serve as a basis for differentiating political
* [613] action. Rather, the lone political office of the 'aqila
[620] involves itself in all arbitration which cannot be successfully concluded by the mechanism of familial authority. There are
[648] just two exceptions which apply to this latter statement:

619 175 648 from forced labor in government projects and released from the payment of taxes. The government agreed to these demands, and on their part, Awlad Ali helped Muhammad Ali extensively in his military expedition in Syria and Arabia and were a major factor in the battle of 1815 at Bissel where he succeeded in breaking Wahabi power. They also helped his son, Ismeal, in his expedition to the Sudan.

[701] Later, when the Egyptian army was organized, the government exempted Awlad Ali and other tribal groups which helped in the military conquests from military service, but required them to undertake the guarding of the desert roads and the frontiers of Egypt. Also, in [423] exchange for their previous services, they were given the right to use the land of the Western Desert and left the question of its distribution among the various tribal segments to the native tribal leaders.

619 175 648 642 Finally, in 1832, Awlad Ali were granted a form of legal and political autonomy whereby the government acknowledged the tribal legal and judicial system as the means to settle disputes between members of the tribe. The government also recognized the authority of the native tribal leaders and allowed the tribal populations to be governed by their own native system of leadership.

This political autonomy of Awlad Ali existed until 1947. Although their usefulness to the government had long ceased to exist, they had continued to enjoy the privileges they had obtained earlier. This was partly due to the fact that the various governments that came after Muhammad Ali showed no interest in the area occupied by Awlad Ali. There were no taxable lands in the area, no natural resources of any promise, and the tribal population did not present any particular prob-
000 lem to attract the attention of the government. There was some smuggling

full-time employment with the government projects in the area and settle in fairly permanent houses near the place of work.

With the movement toward settling down, the relative legal and political autonomy which Awlad Ali once enjoyed is breaking down. This was reflected first in the loss of military exemption. In 1947, the draft law was applied to all tribal populations in Egypt, including Awlad Ali. The application is not seriously enforced, however, due to the fact that births are still not recorded in the area. In 1954, the "omda" or mayorship system practiced in the rural areas of Egypt was extended to the Western Desert with certain modifications to fit the tribal organization of populations in the area. This put a strain on the native system of leadership, a point which will be covered in later chapters. Finally, and along with the extension of the omda system, the jurisdiction of the legal system of the state was extended over the area. This resulted in a duality in the judicial process. The tribal law, with its traditional tribal mediators, is still functioning side by side with the modern court system of the state law. In many cases, especially in criminal cases, the individual is tried under both syatems, and sometimes receives two different judgments for the same offense. Various efforts are being made to minimize the effects of this duality. In civil cases, the problem does not seem serious, since it is the parties themselves, or one of them, who voluntarily bring the case to the attention of the legal authorities. Therefore, they can choose between the traditional legal system and the modern courts of law. So far, civil cases are brought to the modern court system only when the native procedures fail to achieve a settlement. As such, the

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

554 derived from the strength of their section, their wealth, their traditional place in Bedouin society, and the character of their leading members, so long only are they regarded as Shaikhs of whatever the grade may be.

554 619 In recording his impressions of the Aulad 'Ali tribe the generous and unfortunate Pacho gives an excellent picture of the Bedouin Shaikh's position in tribal society. He says that it [642] is difficult to discover any government in their society, which might be called aristocratic, though it is such in form rather than in substance. The precarious authority of the Shaikhs rests not on force but on the renown and esteem they enjoy in the tribe. He adds that at the time of his visit it had become 554 customary, after Muhammad 'Ali Pasha had broken the 619 tribe, for the Shaikhs to get their titles confirmed by the *648 Pasha of Egypt but that when they returned to their camps with the robes of honour bestowed on them by the Pasha of Egypt, these garments, far from adding to their prestige and making them objects of regard, excited derision and aversion unless the backing of the tribe had preceded the approval of the Pasha.[1]

554 613 The Italian lawyer Savarese has also written an illuminating description of the status of a Cyrenaican Bedouin Shaikh. Each *bait* and each *'aila* has its Shaikh, chosen for his age and wisdom or for his prowess, though the Shaikhship is generally [556] hereditary in certain families. A Shaikh receives obedience and respect from his dependants but ought to be rich because the demands of hospitality are considerable. He takes a leading part in the settlement of disputes and must have the tact necessary to maintain the unity of the group in opposition to other groups of the same order. He represents his group in relations with these other groups and in the larger group of which it forms part. In matters in which his group as a whole is concerned he takes the advice of the Shaikhs of its divisions. He commands the men of the group in war and he collects the tribute due from 554 the group to the Government. Nevertheless, a Bedouin Shaikh, however large the group he represents, lives and dresses like his fellow Bedouin, though, being rich, his tent may be larger than most and he has more horses and they are more richly appointed.

[1] J. R. Pacho, *Relation d'un Voyage dans la Marmarique, la Cyrénaïque et les Oasis d'Audjelah et de Maradèh*, 1827, p. 67.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

reconquer Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, but they lacked the will to action. Instead, they vacillated between threats of force on the one side and appeasements and diplomatic surrenders on the other. 175* 648*

Considerable reinforcements were indeed sent to Tripolitania, but when there were assembled there 80,000 men ready for the reconquest of the country, the Government signed with the Arab leaders the humiliating pourparlers of Kallet al-Zaituna in the spring of 1919. The agreement was supplemented on 1 June 1919 by a constitution giving to the Arabs a parliament, Italian citizenship, exemption from taxation, &c. The Arabs were more than ever convinced of Italian impotence. In theory, an Arab republic, the *Jumhuriya al-Trabulsiya*, founded in the previous year under Turco-Germanic influence, now ruled the country through its Committee of Reform at Misurata under the leadership of Ramadan al-Shtaiwi. In fact, there was little order of any kind. Quarrels broke out between tribes and between tribal leaders, anyone powerful enough set himself up as overlord of his district, the Arabs raided the Berbers, outside the narrow coastal region held by their troops Italian officials were little more than consular agents, and when Italian forces took part in Arab disputes they did so rather as mercenaries or allies than as rulers of a colony responsible for peace and security in it. Meanwhile the Committee of Reform made preparations to achieve the complete independence of Tripolitania from Italian rule by securing agreement in principle to a Tripolitanian Amirate from an assembly of notables at Ghariyan in November 1921. The deputation which carried this resolution to Rome, though it received no official encouragement, found much support among Communists, Socialists, and troublemakers of all kinds. Its leader, Muhammad Khalid al-Qarqani, went on to attend the Muslim Revolutionary Congress in Moscow. Such a state of affairs could not last, and in the midst of it Count Giuseppe Volpi was nominated Governor of Tripolitania. He was an energetic man prepared to act on his own responsibility, and by March 1922 he had recaptured Misurata and the whole coastal region between that town and Tunisia and had commenced operations in the Sirtica. [728] 175* 648* 642* [578] 175* 648*

During this period there was peace in Cyrenaica, the fruit of the Accord of 'Akrama. At first the Italians did no more than

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

hold their posts. In 1919 they began to establish civil government in the territory under their control and to extend their influence farther afield. On 31 October of that year Cyrenaica was given a constitution similar to that given to Tripolitania, and its parliament first met in April 1921 under the unlikely presidency of Sayyid Safi al-Din, the old enemy of the Italians in the Sirtica. The tribesmen, of course, elected their own Shaikhs. It held altogether five sessions up to March 1923, when it was closed down. From the Italian point of view the best that could be said for the constitution was that it implied a tacit acceptance of sovereignty and that a parliament brought their officials into personal touch with tribal leaders. Writers of the Fascist period, when the Wilsonian sentiments which inspired the Libyan constitutions were regarded with disfavour, strongly criticized the Government of the day for granting them. Thus Gaibi says that they were bound to bear evil fruit and that 'the Government thought to present itself as a magnanimous conqueror, and the Libyans thought it a beaten coward'.[1] The Bedouin certainly distrusted and despised the Italians and cared as little for their authority in Cyrenaica as their brothers cared for it in Tripolitania. About 100 of their Shaikhs met at Ajadabiya, where they issued a manifesto declaring that, constitution or no constitution, they would not tolerate the Italians outside the coastal towns, and there only as traders. To this insult the Government lamely responded by opening new conversations. After long discussions between the Colonial Governor, Giacomo de Martino, and 'Umar Pasha al-Kakhiya, representing Sayyid Idris, and an exploratory visit by Sayyid al-Rida to Rome, it was agreed that the *modus vivendi* of 'Akrama should be superseded by a new pact, the Accord of al-Rajma of 25 October 1920.

By this new agreement Sayyid Idris was given the hereditary title of 'Sanusi Amir' with the honorific address of Highness and was created Head of the autonomous administration of the oases of Jaghbub, Aujila, Jalu, and Kufra, with the right of using Ajadabiya as the seat of his administration. He was granted a personal monthly allowance of L. 63,000 (on the day of the signing of the accord the Lira was 92 to the Pound

[1] Agostino Gaibi, *Manuale di Storia politico-militare delle Colonie Italiane*, 1928, p. 531.